文章基本信息
- 标题：How does competition impact bank risk-taking
- 本地全文：下载
- 作者：Gabriel Jiménez ; Jose A. Lopez ; Jesús Saurina 等
- 期刊名称：Documentos de Trabajo / Banco de España
- 印刷版ISSN：0213-2710
- 电子版ISSN：1579-8666
- 出版年度：2010
- 卷号：1
- 出版社：Banco de España
- 摘要：
A common assumption in the academic literature is that franchise value plays a key role in
var obten_div = document.getElementById('resumenb2ea5d5d0bea7210VgnVCM1000002cde14acRCRD'); obten_div.className='dv_oculto2'; var div = document.getElementById('capa_ver_resumenb2ea5d5d0bea7210VgnVCM1000002cde14acRCRD'); var ul = document.createElement("ul"); var texto = ' '; texto += ' '; texto += ' '; texto += 'Ver resumen'; texto += ' '; texto += ' '; texto += ' '; ul.innerHTML = texto; div.appendChild(ul);
limiting bank risk-taking. As market power is the primary source of franchise value, reduced
competition in banking markets has been seen as promoting banking stability. We test this
hypothesis using data for the Spanish banking system. We find that standard measures of
market concentration do not affect bank risk-taking. However, we find a negative relationship
between market power measured using Lerner indexes based on bank-specific interest rates
and bank risk. Our results support the franchise value paradigm.
