期刊名称：Hacienda Pública Española. Revista de Economía Pública
印刷版ISSN：0210-1173
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
期号：190
出版社：Ministerio de Hacienda, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
摘要：The purpose of this work is to show under what conditions a marginally progressive income tax emer-
ges as the result of political competition between two parties when labor is elastically supplied and can-
didates are uncertain about voters' decisions on election day. Assuming a decreasing wage elasticity of
labor supply, if we follow Coughlin and Nitzan (1981), only marginal-rate progressive taxes are cho-
sen by both candidates in equilibrium. If, instead, we adopt Lindbeck and Weibull’s (1987) probabi-
listic voting model, the equilibrium tax schedule will be progressive as long as the political power of
the rich voter is sufficiently low. The degree of progressivity decreases with population polarization.
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