期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2010
卷号：2010
期号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：Market Coupling” is currently seen as the most advanced market design in the restructuring of the European
electricity market. Market coupling, by construction, introduces what is generally referred to as an incomplete
market: it leaves several constraints out of the market and hence avoids pricing them. This may or may not
have important consequences in practice depending on the case on hand. Quasi-Variational Inequality
problems and the associated Generalized Nash Equilibrium can be used for representing incomplete markets.
Recent papers propose methods for finding a set of solutions of Quasi-Variational Inequality problems. We
apply one of these methods to a subproblem of market coupling namely the coordination of counter-trading.
This problem is an illustration of a more general question encountered for instance in hierarchical planning in
production management. We first discuss the economic interpretation of the Quasi-Variational Inequality
problem. We then apply the algorithmic approach to a set of stylized case studies in order to illustrate the
impact of different organizations of counter-trading. The paper emphazises the structuring of the problem. A
companion paper considers the full problem of market coupling and counter-trading and presents a more
extensive numerical analysis.
