期刊名称：Cambridge Working Papers in Economics / Faculty of Economics ; Department of Applied Economics
出版年度：2005
卷号：1
出版社：Cambridge University
摘要：Many constitutions specify procedures that allow critical decisions to be made with a different rule from day-to-day decisions. We propose a theory of constitutional rules that explains why. The theory is based on the assumption that the type of decision can be observed, but not verified. We characterise two classes of second-best constitution, both with clear analogues in real world constitutions: i) incentive scheme (IS) constitutions that elicit information about the type of decision through costly decision rule switching procedures, and ii) linking scheme (LS) constitutions that grant limited veto powers to interested parties. We explore how the relative performance of the IS and LS constitution depends on the economic environment.
关键词：constitutions, social contracts, majority rules, vetoes, ref
