期刊名称：Cambridge Working Papers in Economics / Faculty of Economics ; Department of Applied Economics
出版年度：2004
卷号：1
出版社：Cambridge University
摘要：Driven by fear of underinvestment in network assets, merchant investment in electricity transmission networks (MTI) is now legally allowed. Given that MTI is a real possibility, regulators face a new set of questions. After classifying different types of MTI, the paper raises and analyses regulatory questions, concentrating on the effect on competition, ownership questions, third-party-access regimes and must-offer provisions. Basically, the paper concludes that the light-handed approach of unregulated MTI supports a light-handed approach with respect to complementary measures as well. In many cases, it is justified to refrain from sector-specific arrangements because competition law, if necessary at all, will suffice. However, details matter.
