摘要：We examine the economics of infrastructure finance,
focusing on public provision and Public-Private
Partnerships (PPPs). We show that project finance is
appropriate for PPP projects, because there are few
economies of scope and because assets are project
specific. Furthermore, we suggest that the higher
cost of finance of PPPs is not an argument in favour
of public provision, since it appears to reflect the
combination of deficient contract design and the
cost-cutting incentives embedded in PPPs. Thus, in
the case of a correctly designed PPP contract, the
higher cost of capital may be the price to pay for
the efficiency advantages of PPPs. We also examine
the role of government activities in PPP financing
(e.g. revenue guarantees, renegotiations) and their
consequences. Finally, we discuss how to include
PPPs, revenue guarantees and the results of PPP
contract renegotiation in the government balance
sheet.
