期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2010
卷号：2010
期号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：In an overlapping generations setup we address the issue of the optimal number of property rights to
allocate over a natural resource when the goal is to maximize the stock of the natural resource at the
steady state. We assume that the effect of the property rights regime on the evolution of the resource
is twofold: through biological spillovers and through monitoring costs. Property rights are assigned to
local communities, which can decide whether to cooperate or not. The outcome in the strategic setting
is hence compared to the one in the cooperative setup. A fiscal policy able to decentralize the
cooperative outcome is studied
关键词：overlapping generations, resource management, common pool resource, spatial
interdependence, strategic behaviour, cooperative behaviour
