期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2010
卷号：2010
期号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：We consider a model of licensing of a non-drastic innovation in which the patent holder (an outside
innovator) negotiates either up-front fixed fees or per-unit royal- ties with two firms producing
horizontally differentiated brands and competing à la Cournot. We investigate how licensing schemes
(fixed fee or per-unit royalty) and the number of licenses sold (exclusive licensing or complete
technology diffusion) affect price agreements and delays in reaching an agreement. We show that the
patent holder prefers to license by means of up-front fixed fees except if market competition is mild
and the innovation size is small. Once there is private information about the relative bargaining power
of the parties, the patent holder may prefer licensing by means of per-unit royalties even if market
competition is strong. Moreover, the delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the patent
holder chooses to negotiate up-front fixed fees instead of per-unit royalties.
