期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2010
卷号：2010
期号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in
which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a
stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement.
When projects are in- divisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least
core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness
on metric environments with indivisible projects. To do so, we explore, among other things, the performance
of several well-known solutions (such as the Shapley value, the nucleolus, or the Dutta-Ray value) in these
environments
