期刊名称：Discussion Papers in Economics / Department of Economics, Royal Holloway
出版年度：2010
卷号：2010
出版社：University of London
摘要：We propose a model where the size of the public sector and the level of aggregate output are
interconnected through the occupational choice of skilled agents, who di¤er in their degree of
public-mindedness. Whenever the public sector attracts bureaucrats with low degree of public
service motivation, they will use their position to rent seek by employing an excessive number of
unskilled workers. This leads to an equilibrium with relatively high unskilled wages, which lowers
pro.ts and deters entrepreneurship. Conversely, an equilibrium with a lean public sector and
greater private economic activity arises whenever public sector motivated agents populate the state
bureaucracy. These agents exert high e¤ort and employ a limited number of unskilled workers.
We extend the model to show that a bloated public sector with high wages might result from the
optimal voting behaviour of unskilled agents. Finally, we provide evidence documenting speci.c
features of the model using cross-country and Argentinean data.
关键词：Rent Seeking, Occupational Choice, Public Service Motivation, Political Economy.
