摘要：The residential real estate market is in a down cycle never before experienced in the
United States. Faced with cash shortfalls during economic downturns, individuals must decide
which asset(s) to abandon. Because real estate is a major investment and one for which equity
accrues slowly, homesteads are more likely to be forfeited than other assets (e.g., automobile). A
conceptual model is proposed that shifts risk (i.e., interest bearing) between lenders and
homebuyers. Risk shifting allows homebuyers to accrue more equity earlier in the contract and
provides a motive to avoid ruthless behaviors. The shift in risk allows lenders to buy insurance
that lessens the effects (mitigate losses) of future business cycle downturns. Supported by agency
theory and risk analysis, the proposed conceptual model suggests that there is an optimal risk
allocation between lenders and homebuyers.
