期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2010
卷号：2010
期号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：In this paper, wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information
transmission and asymmetric information. In a three- tier model, a regulator is charged by a
political principal to provide a signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe
his type and the production of a correlated signal with a given accuracy is costly for the regulator.
The firm can costlessly provide an alternative signal of lower accuracy that is presented to the
regulator. In a self-enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm-produced signal,
internalizes its own savings in information cost and the firm enjoys higher information rents. The
main feature of soft capture is that it is not based on a reciprocity of favors but on a congruence of
interests between the firm and the regulator.
