期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2010
卷号：2010
期号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：Supply chain management involves the selection, coordination and motivation of independently
operated suppliers. However the central planner's perspective in operations management translates
poorly to vertically separated chains, where suppliers may have rational myopic reasons to object
to full in- formation sharing and centralized decision rights. Particular problems occur when a
downstream coordinator demands relation-specific investments (equipment, cost improvements in
processes, adaptation of components to downstream processes, allocation of future capacity etc)
from upstream suppliers without being able to commit to long-term contracts. In practice and
theory, this leads of- ten to a phenomenon of either underinvestment in the chain or costly vertical
integration to solve the commitment problem. A two-stage supply chain under stochastic demand
and information asymmetry is modelled. A repeated investment-production game with
coordinator commitment in supplier's investment addresses the information sharing and assetspecific
investment problem. We provide a mitigation of the hold-up problem on the investment
cost observed by the supplier and an instrument for truthful revelation of private information by
using an investment sharing device. We show that there is an interior solution for the investment
sharing parameter and discuss some extensions to the work.
