期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2011
卷号：2011
期号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：Evidence suggests that in developing countries, agents rely on mutual insurance
agreements to deal with income or expenditure shocks. This paper analyzes which
risk-sharing networks can be sustained in the long run when individuals are farsighted,
in the sense that they are able to forecast how other agents would react to
their choice of insurance partners. In particular, we study whether the
farsightedness of the agents leads to a reduction of the tension between stability
and efficiency that arises when individuals are myopic. We find that for extreme
values of the cost of establishing a mutual insurance agreement, myopic and
farsighted agents form the same risk-sharing networks. For intermediate costs,
farsighted agents form efficient networks while myopic agents don't
