期刊名称：Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity
印刷版ISSN：1433-8092
出版年度：1999
卷号：1999
出版社：Universität Trier, Lehrstuhl für Theoretische Computer-Forschung
摘要：We introduce the notion of Resettable Zero-Knowledge (rZK),
a new security measure for cryptographic protocols
which strengthens the classical notion of zero-knowledge.
In essence, an rZK protocol is one that remains zero knowledge
even if an adversary can interact with the prover many times, each
time resetting the prover to its initial state and forcing it to
use the same random tape.
All known examples of zero-knowledge proofs and arguments
are trivially breakable in this setting.
Moreover, by definition, all zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge
are breakable in this setting.
Under general complexity assumptions, which hold
for example if the Discrete Logarithm Problem is hard, we construct:
rZK proof-systems for NP with non-constant number of rounds,
five-round Resettable Witness-Indistinguishable proof-systems for NP,
and constant-round rZK arguments for NP in the
public key model where verifiers have
fixed, public keys associated with them.
