期刊名称：SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association
印刷版ISSN：1869-4187
电子版ISSN：1869-4195
出版年度：2011
卷号：2
期号：4
页码：485-496
DOI：10.1007/s13209-011-0048-5
出版社：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
摘要：We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, γ-strategy-proofness—meaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number γ cannot manipulate—and unanimity, we show that such rules are decomposable into one-dimensional rules. Requiring, additionally, anonymity leads to an impossibility result. The paper can be seen as an extension of the model of Border and Jordan (1983) to a continuum of voters. Contrary, however, to their finite case where single voters are atoms, in our model with nonatomic voters even a small amount of strategy-proofness leads to an impossibility.
关键词：Strategy-proof voting; Continuum of voters; Multidimensional policy space; Elliptic preferences
