期刊名称：Discussion Paper / Département des Sciences Économiques de l'Université Catholique de Louvain
印刷版ISSN：1379-244X
出版年度：2006
卷号：1
出版社：Université catholique de Louvain
摘要：I study the optimal redistributive structure when individuals with distinct productivities also differ in disutility of work due to either disability or distase for work. Taxpayers have resentment against inactive benefit recipients because some of them are not actually disabled but lazy. Therefore, disabled people who take up transfers are stigmatized. Their stigma disutility increases with the number of non-disabled recipients. Tagging transfers according to disability characteristics decreases stigme. However, tagging is costly and imperfect. In this context, I show how the level of the per capital cost of monitoring relative to labor earnings of low-wage workers determines the optimality of tagging. Under mild conditions, despite their stigma disutility, inactive and disabled people get a strictly lower consumption than low-wage workers. The results are valid under a utilitarian criterion and a criterion which does not compensage for distate for work.
