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文章基本信息

  • 标题:Competitive in successive markets : entry and mergers
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Jean J. GABSWEWICZ ; Skerkilajda ZANAJ, Skerdilajda, ZANAJ
  • 期刊名称:Discussion Paper / Département des Sciences Économiques de l'Université Catholique de Louvain
  • 印刷版ISSN:1379-244X
  • 出版年度:2006
  • 卷号:1
  • 出版社:Université catholique de Louvain
  • 摘要:This paper analyses successive markets where the intra-market linkage depends on the technology used to produce the final output. We investigate entry of new firms, when entry obtains by expanding the economy as well as collusive agreements between firms. We highlight the differentiated effects of entry corresponding to a constant or decreasing returns, free entry in both markets does not entail the usual tendency for the input price to adjust to its marginal cost while it does under constant returns. Then, we analyse collusive agreements by stressing the role of upstream linkage on the profitability of horizontal mergers à la Salant, Switzer and Reynolds
  • 关键词:Oligopoly, entry, horizontal collusion, foreclosure
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