期刊名称：Discussion Paper / Center for the Study of Law and Economics, Saarbrücken
出版年度：2008
卷号：2
出版社：Center for the Study of Law and Economics
摘要：This paper investigates the effectiveness of the new Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 which replaces the mandatory notification and authorization system by a legal exception system. Effectiveness is operationalized via the two subcriteria compliance to Art. 81 EC Treaty and the probabilities of type I and type II errors committed by the European Commission.
We identify four different types of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria: fullcompliance, zero-compliance, positive-compliance and full-deterrence. We show that the Commission can, in principle, hit the full-compliance equilibrium, where the cartelizing firms fully obey the requirements of Art 81(3) EC Treaty and both error probabilities are zero.
关键词：competition law, cartel law enforcement, legal exception, imperfect
decision making, type I error, type II error
