期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2011
卷号：2011
期号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：In this paper, we consider a population of individuals who differ in two
dimensions: their risk type (expected loss) and their risk aversion. We solve fo r the
profit maximizing menu of contracts that a monopolistic insurer puts out on the
market. First, we find that it is never optimal to fully separate all the types. Second,
if heterogeneity in risk aversion is sufficiently high, then some high - risk
individuals (the risk- tolerant ones) will obtain lower coverage than some low- risk
individuals (the risk- averse ones). Third, we show that when the average man and
woman differ only in risk aversion, gender discrimination may lead to a Pareto
improvement.
