期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2012
卷号：2012
期号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：Conventional capture models rely on the idea that regulator is induced to lenient behavior by the
regulated firm through offers of monetary transfers, the bribery model, or future employment, the
revolving doors model. To avoid socially costly capture, the political principal should then either
implement collusion -proof mechanisms through the delegation of welfare gains, or severely
restrict the career paths of regulatory staff. The paradox of capture is that neither the two modes
of capture, nor the remedy are commonly found in practice. This paper proposes to rethink
capture based on the widespread use of industry-commissioned consultants, e xperts and lobbyists
that produce information for regulatory and policy use. A small model (Agrell and Gautier, 2010)
introduces a 'soft capture' concept based on a self -enforced collusion between the firm and
regulator, linked to the role of the regulator as information -processing intermediate for the
political principal. The firm puts processed but biased information at the free disposal of the
re gulator, 'no strings attached', who can then either use the submitted information or produce a
more accurate information by a costly process. Under a set of mild conditions, the equilibrium
involves soft capture and the regulator uses the submitted information, leading to some distortions
in welfare. A case study of the Occupational Safety and Health Administratio n (OSHA) in USA
serves to motivate and illustrate the model. As shown by the case, the soft capture model may
have a stronger positive potential than the conventional models, also implying that policy advice
based on it may be valuable.
