期刊名称：Discussion Papers / University of Leicester, Department of Economics
出版年度：2012
卷号：2012
出版社：Leicester
摘要：We study evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game assuming a heterogeneous population composed of two types of individuals. Each individual plays one of four possible strategies, two discriminating and two non-discriminating ones, where a discriminating strategy is one whose actions played vary according to the opponent type. When all available strategies are played, in contrast to the game played by a homogeneous population, asymptotic stability vanishes. The population evolves to a neutrally stable state and cooperation emerges with the same frequency as in the homogeneous game. Neutral stability persists if a discriminating strategy is not played by the population. If instead a non-discriminating strategy is not played, asymptotic stability can be achieved. One discriminating strategy survives, the other strategies become extinct and cooperation emerges at a different frequency when compared to the homogeneous game.
