期刊名称：Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers (früher: Bank of Finland Discussion Papers)
印刷版ISSN：0785-3572
电子版ISSN：1456-6184
出版年度：2011
卷号：2011
出版社：Suomen Pankki = Bank of Finland
摘要：We investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO)
compensation and innovation. In an empirical examination of compensation
contracts of S&P 400, 500, and 600 firms we find that long-term incentives in the
form of options are positively related to patents and citations to patents. In
addition, convexity of options has a positive effect on innovation. We also find no
relationship between pay for performance sensitivity (PPS) with patents and
citations to patents while we did discover a positive relationship between these
and golden parachutes. Finally, we show that subsequent to project failure
managers’ compensation contracts are reset favourably. We provide support for
the theory that compensation contracts that offer long-term commitment and
protection from failure are more suitable for innovation.
