期刊名称：Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers (früher: Bank of Finland Discussion Papers)
印刷版ISSN：0785-3572
电子版ISSN：1456-6184
出版年度：2012
卷号：2012
出版社：Suomen Pankki = Bank of Finland
摘要：Consider a competitive bank whose illiquid asset portfolio is funded by short-term debt that has to be refinanced before the asset matures. We show that in this setting maximal transparency is not socially optimal, and that the existence of social externalities of bank failures further lowers the optimal level of transparency. Moreover, asset risk taking recedes as the level of transparency declines towards the socially optimal level. As for the sign of the transparency impact on refinancing risk, it is negative given the risk associated with the asset, but ambiguous if one accounts for its indirect effect via risk taking.
关键词：financial stability, information disclosure, market discipline, Basel III, global games, Diego Moreno, Tuomas Takalo, D43, D82, G14, G21, G28
