首页    期刊浏览 2025年08月17日 星期日
登录注册

文章基本信息

  • 标题:Integration of cognitive and moral enhancement
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Rakić Vojin
  • 期刊名称:Filozofija i drustvo
  • 印刷版ISSN:0353-5738
  • 出版年度:2012
  • 卷号:23
  • 期号:2
  • 页码:91-103
  • DOI:10.2298/FID1202091R
  • 出版社:Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju Beograd
  • 摘要:

    I will discuss four major perspectives on cognitive enhancement and morality: 1) cognitive enhancement is morally impermissible because humans are not supposed to alter what God has ordained or nature has shaped; 2) cognitive enhancement is our moral duty, because a cognitively upgraded human is a better human; 3) cognitive enhancement is morally permissible only if it is preceded by moral enhancement; 4) cognitive enhancement is morally permissible only if it is a means to moral enhancement. I shall argue that the first three perspectives are less cogent than the fourth. The fourth perspective integrates cognitive and moral enhancement into one whole. I will denote it by (C+M) E. [Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 41004 i 43007]

  • 关键词:four perspectives; (C+M) E; integration of enhancement
国家哲学社会科学文献中心版权所有