The objective of this paper is to examine the dynamics of collective bargaining machinery in both the public and private sectors in Nigeria; with a view to bringing to the fore the peculiarities associated with both sectors with regard to the practice of bargaining. To achieve this objective, the paper adopts a theoretical approach. The author observes that the practice of industrial relations as a discipline and that of collective bargaining in particular emanated from the private sector the world over. Thus, much of the practices of public sector collective bargaining are modelled after the private sector collective bargaining. However, in Nigeria, the obverse is the case as collective bargaining gained its root in the public sector owing to the near absence of private sector at the turn of the century. However, in Nigeria, the public sector pays lip-service to the collective bargaining machinery. Governments at all levels (Federal, State and Local) have continued to set aside collective bargaining and to give wage awards to score political points in spite of its commitment to the ILO Convention 98 to freely bargain with workers. The State or the government in the course of regulating wages and employment terms and conditions revert to the use of wage commissions. Thus, wage determination is by fiat. This preference for wage commissions can at best be regarded as a unilateral system as collective bargaining is relegated to the background.Wage tribunals or commissions offer little opportunity for workers’ contribution in the determination of terms and conditions of employment and can hardly be viewed as bilateral or tripartite. Thus, the State preference for wage commissions is anti-collective bargaining. In spite of Nigeria’s commitment to Conventions of the ILO with particular reference to such Conventions as 87 of 1948 and 98 of 1949 which provide for freedom of association and the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively. Thus, the use of wage commissions is antithetical to collective bargaining.