摘要：Extant philosophical accounts of schizophrenic alien thought neglect three clinically significant features of the phenomenon. First, not only thoughts, but also impulses and feelings, are experienced as alien. Second, only a select array of thoughts, impulses, and feelings are experienced as alien. Third, empathy with experiences of alienation is possible. I provide an account of disownership that does justice to these features by drawing on recent work on delusions and self-knowledge. The key idea is that disownership occurs when there is a failure of rational control over one’s mind. This produces a clash between the deliverances of introspection and practical enquiry as ways of knowing one’s mind. This explanation places disownership on a continuum with more common aspects of our psychological life, such as addiction, akrasia, obsessional thinking, and immoral, selfish or shameful thoughts. I conclude by addressing objections, and exploring the relevance of my account to questions in the philosophy of psychiatry concerning the validity of our current taxonomy of symptoms, and the nature of psychiatric classification.
