摘要：The author asks whether intentionality could be described as an internal or an external relation. After he has shown that it is impossible to reduce intentionality to mere external (e.g. causal) relations, he emphasizes that it is not possible either to consider it to be an internal relation exclusively. There is no intentional internal relation without its context of external relations that permit it to work. The author tries to make a case for that by analyzing the problem of the determination of intentionality as related to the anticipative structure of intentionality, with special attention on the one hand to the issue of ambiguities and on the other hand to the one of impossibilities. He tries to show that the ability for the intentionality to self-determine depends on conditions which pertain to circumstances. His demonstration is in line with some kind of externalism (intentional externalism) in the philosophy of mind.
关键词：Intentionality; internality; externality; relation; philosophy of mind
