摘要：The main purpose of this article is an analysis of the Continuity Argument, one of the most influential arguments upon which the moral condemnation of scientific and medical practices such as embryo research and experimentation, assisted reproduction, abortion, therapeutic cloning, etc. are based. I have firstly given a very brief account of the approach that attributes the status of marker event to fertilization, identifying the Continuity Argument between other argumentation. Further, I have tried to distinguish the three possible interpretations of the notion of continuity assumed in the Continuity Argument, and to isolate the most persuasive formulation of Continuity Argument. Finally, I argue that even from the most convincing philosophical and scientific interpretation of the post-fertilization continuity, it does not follow: (1) that fertilization is a necessary determinant of moral status; (2) that fertilization is the most reasonable determinant of moral status. In short, this article has two goals: (i) to show that this very argument does not entail the stance that the above mentioned practices are morally impermissible; (ii) to suggest that some pragmatic strategies which treat sorites-infected paradoxes could insure a philosophically and scientifically appropriate framework for an alternative approach.
