摘要：The result of Kant’s reflection on the traditional concept of truth as adequacy between knowledge or concept and object – that there is no general material or general formal criterion of truth which would be sufficient – leads towards the critical insight that we are regarding (allegedly mere) holding to be true, and that it presents itself in three modes: either as opinion, belief or knowledge. Therefore, not only with Hegel, but with Kant as well, it came to be realised that proposition is not “adequate” to “express” truth, but that proposition – understood as an objectively valid relation which we formed – is what we hold to be true. What is striking and unsurpassably current in this finding is primarily the unique position and weight of knowledge which, according to Kant, also presents (just) a mode of holding to be true, and not that kind – unattainable to a human – in which we the truth could be insured without question.(One can not say seriously: “I know p, because p“.) Thus, the critical philosophy is by no means no only met in the insight that existence cannot be “picked out” of concept, but also in a no less fundamental (although often and gladly overlooked) insight that equally little can be inferred from the existence of concept.
关键词：truth; holding to be true; material criterion of truth; formal criterion of truth; opinion; belief; knowledge; relativism
