摘要：The idea that we should concern ourselves with developing good character is common in ethical discourse and proclaimed from a wide variety of meta-ethical positions. If moral goodness is primarily a matter of good character, of course, then it seems obvious that this should be our concern. But if moral value at-taches primarily to actions in respect of the intentions behind them or the consequences they have, then the development of good character might be the best way to promote good action (see Nussbaum 1999: esp. § I; Trianosky 1997: esp. § 3). From these different perspectives, philosophers recommend a range of character traits. But there is a growing dissatisfaction with this consensus, rooted in a concern that the psychological picture involved is unwarranted. Philosophical talk of character should be grounded in the findings of experimental psychology, critics argue, but is instead usually based ultimately only on common-sense intuitions. Gilbert Harman, for example, claims that .it may even be the case that there is no such thing as character, no ordinary character traits of the sort people think there are, none of the usual moral virtues and vices. (1999: 316). .Far too many moral philosophers have been content to invent the psychology or anthropology on which their theories depend., write John Doris and Stephen Stich (2005: 114).
