期刊名称：Discussion Paper / Département des Sciences Économiques de l'Université Catholique de Louvain
印刷版ISSN：1379-244X
出版年度：2012
卷号：1
出版社：Université catholique de Louvain
摘要：We develop a methodology to sign output distortions in the random participation framework. We apply our method to monopoly nonlinear pricing problem, to the regulatory monopoly problem and mainly to the optimal income tax problem. In the latter framework, individuals are heterogeneous across two unobserved dimensions: their skill and their disutility of participation to the labor market. We derive a fairly mild condition for optimal marginal tax rates to be non negative everywhere, implying that in-work e ort is distorted downwards. Numerical simulations for the U.S. con rm this property. Moreover, it is typically optimal to provide a distinct level of transfer to the non-employed and to workers with zero or negligible earnings.
关键词：Adverse selection; Optimal taxation; Random participation.
