期刊名称：Discussion Paper / Département des Sciences Économiques de l'Université Catholique de Louvain
印刷版ISSN：1379-244X
出版年度：2012
卷号：1
出版社：Université catholique de Louvain
摘要：This paper aims to assess the e ects of an immigration amnesty on agents' welfare by using a simple two-period overlapping generations model. Given that illegal immigrants play a role in the economy even before being regularized, an amnesty di ers from new immigration. In the presence of labor market discrimination, capital holders are harmed as the acquisition of legal status increases the wage bill that they pay. The net scal e ect strongly depends on the discrimination that illegal workers face ex ante. A calibration of the model on Germany and the United Kingdom highlights overall limited economic consequences of amnesty which can be contrasted to the e ects of deportation and new legal immigration. In particular, when public welfare expenditures are low, amnesty and new immigration can increase native's welfare in the long run while deportation might harm less-educated agents.
