期刊名称：FEEM Working Papers / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei = Nota di Lavoro
出版年度：2012
卷号：2012
出版社：Milano
摘要：Using a natural voting experiment in Switzerland that encompasses a 160-year period (1848–2009), we investigate whether a higher level of complexity leads to increased reliance on expert knowledge. We find that when more referenda are held on the same day, constituents are more likely to refer to parliamentary recommendations in making their decisions. This finding holds true even when we narrow our focus to referenda with a relatively lower voter turnout on days on which more than one referendum was held. We also show that when constituents face a higher level of complexity, they listen to parliament rather than interest groups.
关键词：Bounded Rationality; Voting; Referenda Attention; Rules of Thumb
