摘要：Triggered by the terror attacks of 9/11, the subsequent international intervention in Afghanistan has catapulted the country to the centre of international political attention. The military intervention by the US forces and its allies, which started in October 2001 and led to the consecutive collapse of the Taliban regime in November/December 2001,resulted in a power vacuum which was immediately filled by hundreds of commanders as well as tribal and religious leaders. These ‘big men’ either possess certain legitimacy or control the means of violence to a sufficient degree. This development was further strengthened by the US-strategy to use Afghan militias to back up their fight against the remnants of al- Qaida and the Taliban.1 Thus the world suddenly became aware of structures of power which developed during 22 years of continuous war in the absence of a functioning state which could hardly be changed by a military intervention from one day to another. Consequently, the internationally stimulated peace process in Afghanistan was repeatedly shaken by recurring acts of violence and a lacking designation of clear responsibilities for security tasks. This volatile situation was grasped by international observers as a complete lack of security and regarded as the core obstacle for all political steps of the peace process – the Emergency Loya Lirga in June 2002, the Constitutional Loya Jirga in December 2003, the presidential elections in September 2004 and the parliamentary elections in September 2005. No one less than Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nations special envoy to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2003, coined the saying that Afghanistan is in need of three things: ‘Security, security and security’
