摘要：In a sy~optic overview of the vicissitudes of scientific explanation during the cou~se of the twentieth century, one fact stands out above all others. In the ~arly decades the dominant view among philosophers and scientists was thflt science does not provide explanations at all, whereas in the closing decades it is widely held that science is capable of furnishing explanations of many aspects of the world. This change results, not so much from the dramatic successes achieved in various scientific domains during the century, but rather from a difference in philosophical orientation. In the earlier parts of the century it was often said that the business of science is to describe the phenomena, to predict future facts, and to organize and systematize our knowledge of the world; if one wanted explanations it was necessary to leave the domain of science and seek understanding in metaphysics or theology. Rudolf Carnap (1966, 1974) provides an illuminating discussion of this attitude toward explanation in the early decades. Roughly speaking, it was held that science can tell us what but not why. Present scientists seem not at all reluctant to offer explanations of the phenomena with which they are concerned and philosophers of science, by and large, do not deplore this situation. Quite the contrary, a number of philosophers maintain that the achievement of explanatory truth (or approximate truth, or well-supported explanatory theories) is one of the major aims of 'scientific investigation, if not the principal goal. As always, there are, of course, some philosophers who disagree
