摘要:What is the proper attitude of the evolutionary epistemologist towards science? Should he regard science as disclosing (or aiming to disclose) information concerning the way the world is in itself, independently of the species-specific needs, bias and cognitive orientation of the human life-form? Or should he conceive it as intrinsically limited and indelibly marked with the stamp of his own humanity? Either way there is a problem. If he adopts the first, objectivist,interpretation he faces the charge of hypocrisy; why does he not extend the results of his conjectures concerning cognition in other species to the enquiring animal, man? To make that extension, and to regard our scientific knowledge as biased and limited in ways analogous to those attributed to the lower animals, is, however, to breed a deeper discomfort. For if he adopts a species-specific, nonobjectivist account of scientific knowledge then the status of the evolutionary conjecture itself is brought into question. For by what right does the evolutionary theorist then quantify over all evolved life-forms in formulating his general picture of the relation between cognition and reality ?