摘要：
Two related and relatively obscure issues in science have eluded
empirical tractability. Both can be directly traced to progress
in artificial intelligence. The first is scientific proof of consciousness
or otherwise in anything. The second is the role of consciousness
in intelligent behaviour. This document approaches both issues by
exploring the idea of using scientific behaviour self-referentially
as a benchmark in an objective test for P-consciousness, which is
the relevant critical aspect of consciousness. Scientific behaviour
is unique in being both highly formalised and provably critically
dependent on the P-consciousness of the primary senses. In the context
of the primary senses P-consciousness is literally a formal identity
with scientific observation. As such it is intrinsically afforded
a status of critical dependency demonstrably no different to any
other critical dependency in science, making scientific behaviour
ideally suited to a self-referential scientific circumstance. The
‘provability’ derives from the delivery by science of
objectively verifiable ‘laws of nature’. By exploiting
the critical dependency, an empirical framework is constructed as
a refined and specialised version of existing propositions for a
‘test for consciousness’. The specific role of P-consciousness
is clarified: it is a human intracranial central nervous system
construct that symbolically grounds the scientist in the distal
external world, resulting in our ability to recognise, characterise
and adapt to distal natural world novelty. It is hoped that in opening
a discussion of a novel approach, the artificial intelligence community
may eventually find a viable contender for its long overdue scientific
basis.
