期刊名称：SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association
印刷版ISSN：1869-4187
电子版ISSN：1869-4195
出版年度：2013
卷号：4
期号：2
页码：137-153
DOI：10.1007/s13209-011-0083-2
出版社：Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
摘要：n agents located along a river generate residues that then require cleaning to return the river to its natural state, which entails some cost. We propose several rules to distribute the total pollutant-cleaning cost among all the agents. We provide axiomatic characterizations using properties based on water taxes. Moreover, we prove that one of the rules coincides with the weighted Shapley value of a game associated with the problem.
关键词：Cost sharing; Pollutant-cleaning cost; Water taxes
