期刊名称：GREQAM Documents de Travail / Groupement de Recherche en Economie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille
出版年度：1998
摘要：We deal with an OLG model in which human capital accumulation depends on two inputs: the personal effort of individuals to train themselves and the weight of the public education system represented by its teacher-pupils ratio. This one partly depends on the percentage of teachers chosen by the State. Even if the individual also influences the teacher-pupils ratio because of his own training effort wich alters the number of pupils per class, each one taken individually disregards this effect. This last point entails a break between equilibrium and optimum and thus justifies a State intervention in order to compensate fot this sub-optimality. We show that a subsidy to education together with intergenerational transfers (the second welfare theorem) are sufficient to restore the conditions of optimality of the competitive equilibrium. Finally, with a constant rate growth path, we study the impact of the parameters of the model on the optimal values of the educational variables and growth.
关键词：Formal education; Externality; Centralized optimum; Subsidies to education; teacherpupils;ratio.
