出版社：Richards College of Business, University of West Georgia
摘要：This paper adapts the discriminating monopolist model to consumer lending and provides results of an empirical study pertaining to the implications of this model. The case of second-degree price discrimination is used to illustrate how banks segment consumers into categories and price each category differently in order to increase profits and stockholder wealth. The issue of the asymmetric information problem is examined within the context of credit bureaus and credit scoring. Also, the paper reports the results of a study of 156 banks conducted in the summer of 2004 that examined the extent towhich specific factors are used to segment consumers into categories when making consumer loans. Seventy-eight percent of respondent banks indicated that credit risk is a primary factor used in segmentation. The factor given the highest relative importance rank in segmenting customers was also credit risk, followed by collateral, and the purpose of the loan. Overall, the results are consistent with the model investigated in the paper. By incorporating segmentation into risk-based pricing of consumer loans, banks increase profitability and the wealth of their stockholders.
