摘要：The controversy between liberalism and communitarianism has made salient the question whether the demands of justice should claim only universal validity, or be rather context-sensitive. One particular problem is related to the two Rawlsian principles of justice, which state how the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties. Do these principles have only a contextual validity, since they are designed for the basic structure of society? In this paper, I argue that a contextual reading of the Rawlsian principles of justice is not justified. I will show that there are good arguments to understand the principles for the basic structure of society as context-transcending, but holding at the same time at least a minimal or backup validity for all so-called spheres of justice. This argumentation does not amount to a critique of contextualism, as in fact it does not need to reject this position.
关键词：Rawls; universalism; contextualism; spheres of justice
