文章基本信息
- 标题：Is Consciousness not a Computational Property? --- Reply to Bojadziev
- 本地全文：下载
- 作者：Gilbert Caplain
- 期刊名称：Informatica
- 印刷版ISSN：1514-8327
- 电子版ISSN：1854-3871
- 出版年度：2000
- 卷号：24
- 期号：1.
- 出版社：The Slovene Society Informatika, Ljubljana
- 摘要：
In {Caplain95}, I have argued that consciousness cannot be adequately described as a computational structure and/or process. This argument is challenged by Damjan Bojadziev {Boj00} (this issue). This paper contains my replies and comments.
- 关键词：consciousness; knowledge; belief; artificial intelligence
