期刊名称：Reason Papers : A Journal of Interdisciplinary Normative Studies
印刷版ISSN：0363-1893
出版年度：2011
卷号：33
页码：107-109
出版社：Reason Papers
摘要：When evaluating policy reforms, a simple “liberty principle” can be invoked where only policies that are liberty-augmenting are supported. But what happens if some facets of policies are liberty-augmenting while other facets are liberty-reducing? Even when following a Rothbardian definition of liberty, the concept can become vague with unresolved issues leading to potential limitations surrounding the principle of liberty. In a recent article in Reason Papers, Daniel Klein and Michael Clark present areas of potential disagreement when evaluating prospective policy reforms between direct, immediate effects, and overall liberty, including direct and indirect, or secondary effects.1 It is possible that a policy change could be directly liberty- reducing, but, overall, liberty-augmenting (or vice versa), suggesting a possible a tension between the two. If such tensions exist and a reform is supposed to be evaluated based on the liberty principle, how does one choose between alternative policies?
