期刊名称：International Journal of Advanced Research In Computer Science and Software Engineering
印刷版ISSN：2277-6451
电子版ISSN：2277-128X
出版年度：2013
卷号：3
期号：5
出版社：S.S. Mishra
摘要：A new class of physical attacks against cryptographic modules, called as side-channel attacks (SCA) are a powerful technique to reveal secret keys of cryptographic devices. SCA tries to exploit specific properties of the implementation, operating environment such as timing, power or electro-magnetic analysis of a cryptosystem. This paper presents the timing based side-channel attacks in which the attacker tries to break a cryptographic algorithm by using information about the execution times of its encryption or decryption queries. In general, a timing attack watches data movement of the CPU and of memory, while an algorithm is running. By carefully measuring the amount of time required to perform operations, attackers may be able to find the secret keys, and break cryptosystems. Removing timing-dependencies is difficult in algorithms that use operations that frequently exhibit varied execution time. Timing attacks may become serious threat to security of cryptographic algorithms if the adversary knows the internals of the hardware implementation, and even more so, the cryptosystem in use. Sometimes this timing information is combined with cryptanalysis to improve the rate of information leakage.
