摘要：Avtor v prispevku s pomo.jo ekonomske analize prava razpravlja o problemu asimetrije informacij v pogodbenem pravu. Uvodoma obravnava temelje ekonomske teorije pogodb ter predstavi teorijo sklepanja pogodb na popolnem in nepopolnem trgu. Pri tem ugotavlja, da je asimetrija informacij kot napaka trga eden izmed najpogostej.ih zapletov pri sklepanju pogodb. Posledice asimetrije so prepogosto oziroma preredko sklepanje pogodb, trg limon in napake volje, zato mora na trg informacij pose.i pravo s svojimi instituti. Avtor kot temeljno pravilo obravnava dol.nost razkritja informacij, ki ga dopolni z izjemo v primerih na.rtno pridobljenih in produktivnih informacij.
其他摘要：In his paper author discusses the issue of asymmetric information in contract law, using historical, comparative and economic analysis. He starts with the general economical theory of contracts and represents the asymmetric of information as the most common market failure. Further, he analyses the effects of asymmetric information in contracting and suggests a disclosure rule as a general solution for the problem. His final finding is that the general rule must be supplemented with an exception in the case of productive deliberately acquired information
关键词：pogodbeno pravo . informacije . asimetrija informacij . ;ekonomska analiza prava . sklepanje pogodb . trg limon
其他关键词：contract law . information . asymmetric information . ;economic analysis of law . contracting . market of lemons ;C;ORRESPONDENCE ;A;DDRESS;: Jaka Cepec; LL.B.; Assistant; University of Ljubljana; Faculty of ;Economics; Kardeljeva plo..ad 17; SI-1000 Ljubljana; e-mail: jaka.cepec@ef.uni-lj.si. ;ISSN 1855-7147 Print / 1855-7155 On-line . 2009 LeXonomica (Maribor) ;UDC: 347.44:659.2 ;Available on-line at http://www.lexonomica.com
