期刊名称：International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications
印刷版ISSN：0975-2307
电子版ISSN：0974-9330
出版年度：2011
卷号：3
期号：4
DOI：10.5121/ijnsa.2011.340775
出版社：Academy & Industry Research Collaboration Center (AIRCC)
摘要：Modelling resource allocation problems in the form of non-cooperative pricing games takes into account the difference between how much a given performance metric is valued and how much is paid for it. For the convergence of the sum of all users' payoff to a global maximum, the determination of the utility function is essential. Although supermodularity conditions have been previously defined and determined to obtain suitable utility functions, different utilities have significantly varying performance characteristics under similar network parameters. In an ad-hoc framework, absence of a central authority leads to uncontrollability of unfairness. Users could misbehave by broadcasting high price coefficients to force other users to transmit at a lower power. This paper proposes an adaptation of the Asynchronous Distributed Pricing Algorithm with a Deviation Detection Block that re-aligns the deviated system back into the algorithm
