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文章基本信息

  • 标题:Game Analysis of SME Financing
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Pingzhong Lin
  • 期刊名称:Journal of Financial Risk Management
  • 印刷版ISSN:2167-9533
  • 电子版ISSN:2167-9541
  • 出版年度:2012
  • 卷号:1
  • 期号:4
  • 页码:64-67
  • DOI:10.4236/jfrm.2012.14011
  • 出版社:Scientific Research Publishing
  • 摘要:The SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) play important role in the economy. However, the financing problem is a big difficulty, which has plagued the SMEs’ development. Information asymmetry is the main reason for the SMEs’ gaining funds so hard. The information asymmetry between banks and enterprises is that banks do not know the operating conditions and credit situation of SMEs. Then, to some extent, the banks are reluctant to support credit for businesses under the circumstance of lacking appropriate information, resulting in a “credit crunch” behavior. Therefore, the main measures of solving SMEs’ financing difficulty are to overcome the information asymmetry in the process of SME financing by establishing effective information mechanisms, the credibility and restraint mechanisms, strengthening the construction of credit rating agencies, and promoting the mutual exchange of information.
  • 关键词:Credit Crunch; Game; Information Asymmetry; Adverse Selection
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