期刊名称：Journal of Software Engineering and Applications
印刷版ISSN：1945-3116
电子版ISSN：1945-3124
出版年度：2012
卷号：5
期号：12B
页码：30-35
DOI：10.4236/jsea.2012.512B007
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：In this paper, we propose a novel game-theoretical solution to the multi-path routing problem in wireless ad hoc networks comprising selfish nodes with hidden information and actions. By incorporating a suitable traffic allocation policy, the proposed mechanism results in Nash equilibria where each node honestly reveals its true cost, and forwarding subgame perfect equilibrium in which each node does provide forwarding service with its declared service reliability. Based on the generalised second price auction, this mechanism effectively alleviates the over-payment of the well-known VCG mechanism. The effectiveness of this mechanism will be shown through simulations.
关键词：Wireless ad hoc network; non-cooperative networks; hidden information; hidden action; mechanism design; GSP auction.
