摘要：To explore the parking pricing of multiple parking facilities, this paper proposes a bi-level programming model, in which the interactions between parking operators and travelers are explicitly considered. The upper-level sub-model simulates the price decision-making behaviors of the parking operators whose objectives may vary under different operation regimes, such as monopoly market, oligopoly competition, and social optimum. The lower level represents a network equilibrium model that simulates how travelers choose modes, routes, and parking facilities. The proposed model is solved by a sensitivity based algorithm, and applied to a numerical experiment, in which three types of parking facilities are studied, i.e., the off-road parking lot, the curb parking lot, and the parking-and-ride (P&R) facility. The results show in oligopoly market that the level of parking price reaches the lowest point, nonetheless the social welfare decreases to the lowest simultaneously; and the share of P&R mode goes to the highest value, however the total network costs rise also to the highest. While the monopoly market and the social optimum regimes result in solutions of which P&R facilities suffer negative profits and have to be subsidized.
